In ancient times, the island of Cyprus was ruled by the Roman Empire (395–1184), the Lusignans (1192–1489), and the Venetians (1489–1571). The Ottoman Empire governed Cyprus from 1571–1878. Weakened by defeat in the Turkish-Russian war of 1877–78, the Sultan sought military assistance from Great Britain prior to the → Berlin Congress (1878). In return for the British engagement, he consented to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England in a bilateral Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, signed 4 June 1878 (for the negotiating history of the Convention, see Lee 88).
2. Annexation by the United Kingdom
2
On 5 November 1914, through an order in Council, King George V annexed the island of Cyprus in response to the Sultan's decision to join the war coalition against the Allied Powers. The legality of this order under international law could, however, be questioned. While it is true that the outbreak of the war between the parties had automatically terminated the 1878 Convention, the legal consequence thereof was only that the power to administrate Cyprus reverted back to the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, the → annexation of Cyprus can only be qualified as a belligerent annexation. Whether the effective peaceful administration of the territory at the time of the annexation was sufficient instead of military occupation is subject to debate. In any case, even if the annexation could be qualified as initially illegal (Hofstötter 46–53 with further references), the United Kingdom received title over the island at the latest by 1923, when Turkey recognized the annexation of Cyprus in Art. 20 Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Turkey (‘Treaty of Lausanne’; → Lausanne Peace Treaty [1923]).
3
After first being treated as a dominion, Cyprus formed a crown colony of the United Kingdom between 1925–60. During that period, the population on the island consisted of 80% Greek Cypriots and 18% Turkish Cypriots. They inter-mingled, sometimes lived in mixed villages or towns, scattered all over the island. In a → referendum in 1950, organized by the Greek Orthodox Church, a large majority of Greek Cypriots expressed their wish for the island to unite with Greece (enosis). Negotiations on self-government followed between Archbishop Makarios and the British Governors, Harding and Foot, in the second half of the decade. From 1955, the Greek Cypriot underground organization ‘EOKA’, under the leadership of the Cyprus-born Greek General Grivas, engaged in acts of violence against the Colonial Power in order to achieve Cyprus' union with Greece. As a counterweight, Turkish Cypriots established the paramilitary ‘Turkish Resistance Organisation (‘TMT’) in 1958, which called for partition (taksim).
4
Being seized by the Greek government, the UN General Assembly, in two resolutions of February 1957 and December 1958 (UNGA Res 1013 [XI]; UNGA Res 1287 [XIII]), declared that a peaceful, democratic, and just solution should be found in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter through negotiations.
3. The Zurich and London Agreements
5
On 19 June 1958, the British Prime Minister Macmillan announced in Parliament that Cyprus should be governed jointly by the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey (Statement by the Prime Minister; ‘Macmillan Plan’). The Macmillan Plan triggered bilateral negotiations between Ankara and Athens. In Zurich, on 11 February 1959, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey initialled three documents (‘Zurich Agreement’): (a) the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus; (b) a Draft Treaty of Alliance; and (c) a Draft Treaty on Guarantee. A week later, in a conference held in London on 19 February 1959, the Prime Ministers of the three powers signed the Memorandum setting out the Agreed Foundation of the Final Settlement of the Problem of Cyprus (‘London Agreement’) which repeated the results of the Zurich negotiations while inserting an additional article into the Treaty of Guarantee. After some hesitation, Archbishop Makarios, on behalf of the Greek Cypriot Community, and Dr Kücük, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot Community, declared that they ‘accept[ed] the documents and declarations as an agreed foundation for the final settlement’. Implementing the London Agreement, the British Parliament adopted the Cyprus Act on 29 July 1960, which empowered the Queen to pass an order in Council bringing into force the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus on a given day. With the adoption of that order the United Kingdom passed → sovereignty on to the newly independent republic (Chrysostomides 51–52).
(a) The Constitution
6
Based on the 27 Basic Articles agreed in London, a fully-fledged constitution consisting of 199 articles was proclaimed on 16 August 1960. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus established a bi-communal regime, based on power sharing between the two main communities. Executive power was vested in a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, the latter holding veto power on a number of important issues. A Ministerial Council consisted of 7 Greek Cypriots and 3 Turkish Cypriots, one key ministry—foreign affairs, defence, finance—being reserved for a Turkish Cypriot. The Parliament was similarly elected on a 7:3 basis. While generally legislation could be adopted by simple majority, separate majorities of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of parliament were necessary for certain matters. Finally, separate communal chambers were assigned the task of dealing with matters which were important for the development of the communities, such as religion, education, and other communal affairs. Importantly, Art. 182 Cyprus Constitution declared that the 27 Basic Articles were not amenable to any modification, making the constitution very rigid.
(b) The Three Treaties
7
On 16 August 1960, the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey concluded the Treaty of Guarantee. According to Art. I Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus undertook not to participate in ‘union with any other State’ or to proceed to partition. The three powers guaranteed the ‘independence, territorial integrity and security’ of the republic as well as the Basic Articles of the Cyprus Constitution (Art. II Treaty of Guarantee). In the event of a breach, Art. IV (2) Treaty of Guarantee gave each Guarantor Power a right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty of Guarantee (see paras 22–23 below).
8
The Treaty of Guarantee was complemented by the Treaty of Alliance between the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. This Treaty provided for the stationing of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops on the island. Their mandate was to assist in the training of the Cypriot army.
9
Finally, technical details on the transfer of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to Cyprus were laid down in the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (‘Establishment Treaty’). The territory of Cyprus was defined as the island of Cyprus with the exception of two British military bases, ‘which areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom’ (Art. 1 Establishment Treaty). The ‘Sovereign Base Areas’ of Akrotiri and Dhekelia cover together approximately 256 square kilometres; around 3% of the island's territory.
(c) Independence
10
With the entry into force of the Cypriot Constitution and the three treaties (paras 7–9 above), the Republic of Cyprus was established on 16 August 1960. Lauterpacht derives from the acceptance by both leaders of the 1959 Zurich/London agreements that both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot community were entitled to, and had exercised, a separate right to → self-determination. However, such contention can be rejected in light of the view that only a colonial people as a whole, but not separate communities thereof, enjoy the right to self-determination. Accordingly, with the foundation of the bi-communal republic, the Cypriot people, represented by the leaders of the two communities, had already exercised its right to self-determination under Art. 1 (2) UN Charter at the London Conference (Hoffmeister 6–11 with further references).
B. The United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus
1. The Establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
11
Cyprus became a member of the → United Nations (UN) on 21 September 1960. As of 21 December 1963, bi-communal strife broke out when Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot paramilitary troops attacked civilian quarters of Nicosia where members of the opposite community were living. When the Turkish contingent moved out of its barracks to the Kyrenia road, north of Nicosia, and Turkish jets flew a ‘warning flight’ on Christmas day, the Cyprus government raised a complaint against Turkey before the UN Security Council (‘Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council’ [26 December 1963] UN Doc S/5488).
12
On the same day, the three Guarantor powers agreed to station a joint truce force. The British Commander drew a ‘green line’ between the quarters of Nicosia, including a neutral zone on 30 December 1963 (Green Line Agreement). 2,700 British troops and the Greek and Turkish contingents on the island were to maintain public order and security, but fighting continued. After the breakdown of an international conference to find a diplomatic solution, the UN Security Council was again seized by Cyprus together with the United Kingdom on 14 February 1964. With UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, the Security Council established a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (‘UNFICYP’) with the consent of Cyprus (→ Peacekeeping Forces). By the end of March, approximately 6,000 UN soldiers from Western countries under the command of General Gyani (from India) were deployed to the island. They could not prevent further fighting until August, when the UN Security Council, in its Resolution 193 (1964), called on both sides for the immediate ending of Turkish air-bombing and Greek Cypriot attacks on the ground. The total number of casualties over the period from 21 December 1963 to 9 August 1964 is disputed, but a possible figure is about 193 Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greek Cypriots killed, in addition to many persons who were missing. During this period, between 20,000 and 25,000 Turkish Cypriots were forced to flee to → enclaves (see UNSC Special Research Report No 3, 4).
2. The Mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
13
Under UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) UNFICYP originally received the mandate to (a) prevent a recurrence of fighting; (b) contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order; and (c) contribute to a return to normal conditions.
14
Details of these three tasks were laid down in a circular from the Secretary-General (UNSC ‘Note by the Secretary-General’ [11 April 1964] UN Doc S/5653), clarifying in particular that the troops would not take any initiative in using arms except in situations of → self-defence.
15
In November 1967, new inter-communal fighting broke out. When Makarios resisted demands from the Greek military dictatorship which had assumed power in April 1967 to declare enosis, armed units of the National Guard under the command of General Grivas attacked Turkish Cypriot enclaves in Kokkina. UNFICYP was unable to offer protection due to the lack of a mandate under Chapter VII UN Charter to engage during conflicts between the communities. Turkish aircraft bombed Greek Cypriot forces and Ankara prepared a military intervention (→ Intervention, Prohibition of). Following international pressure, Greece recalled General Grivas from the island and reduced its forces. UN Security Council Resolution 244 (1967) ([22 December 1967] SCOR 22nd Year 11) expanded UNFICYP's mandate to include the supervision of disarmament and arrangements to safeguard internal security.
16
After the hostilities of 1974 (see paras 20–23 below), the UN Security Council adopted a number of resolutions expanding UNFICYP's mandate. The changes included supervising the de facto ceasefire that came into effect on 16 August 1974, and maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of the Cypriot National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces. Following reports of the Secretary-General (every June and December) to the UN Security Council on the status of the Cyprus conflict and UNFICYP, the UN Security Council regularly renews the mandate for six-month terms (the latest decision was taken pursuant to para. 6 UNSC Res 1873 [2009]). Currently, UNFICYP has a force level of 860 military personnel.
3. The Significance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964)
17
In parallel to the military confrontation, the constitutional landscape of Cyprus changed drastically in 1964. In November 1963, President Makarios made 13 proposals for constitutional amendments, which would have decreased Turkish Cypriot participation in the State institutions. From the last week of December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and the Turkish members of the Council of Ministers ceased assuming office. Rather, these executives started to regulate life in the Turkish Cypriot controlled areas, while the Turkish Cypriot members of Parliament met separately. Many Turkish Cypriot civil servants quit their functions in the ministries, reportedly upon instructions from the Turkish Cypriot leadership (Özgür 34). Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot leaders and Turkey contested the legitimacy of the Makarios government to speak for Cyprus.
18
Against that background, it was significant that the UN Security Council, in Resolution 186 (1964), continued to regard the Cyprus government as the sole representative of the Republic of Cyprus. When referring to the ‘government of Cyprus’ in Resolution 186 (1964) para. 2, it implicitly recognized the government under President Makarios as the legitimate government, distinct from the ‘communities and their leaders’, mentioned in Resolution 186 (1964) para. 3. Moreover, for the stationing of UNFICYP on the island, the UN Security Council sought the consent of Cyprus under Resolution 186 (1964) para. 4, which meant in practice an agreement with the Cypriot government under Makarios. The UN Security Council thereby regarded the international legitimacy of the Greek-Cypriot government as being unaffected by the absence of the Turkish Cypriot executives.
19
With the international status of the republic being secured, the Makarios government took a series of domestic measures to take account of absence of Turkish Cypriots in the State institutions. A new Supreme Court was created in July 1964, the separate lists of the election of Turkish Cypriot members of Parliament and the Turkish Cypriot Vice President were abolished, and Greek Cypriots took over the posts in the Council of Ministers in July 1965. In October 1964, the Supreme Court found in the case of The Attorney-General of the Republic v Ibrahim and Others ([Supreme Court of Cyprus] [Nicosia 6 October 1964] [1964] Cyprus Law Reports 195) that passing such measures without following the text of the Constitution had been necessary in order to preserve the constitutional order (doctrine of necessity). The existence of the doctrine and its proper application has since then given rise to controversy (see Chrysostomides 110; Hoffmeister, 23–31; Özersay 31–71). However, even if certain measures of Hellenisation could be regarded as unconstitutional under domestic law, they did not affect the legitimacy of the Cypriot government or the Republic of Cyprus under international law. Subsequent judicial practice is unanimous in this regard (see Case C–432/92 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Anastasiou [1994] ECR I-3087 para. 47; Cyprus v Turkey [ECtHR] Reports 2001-IV paras 61–62).
C. The Turkish Intervention
1. The Coup d'Etat Against President Makarios and the Turkish Reaction
20
On 15 July 1974, the governing military junta of Greece, sponsored a → coup d'état against Cypriot President Makarios. After the Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers, had occupied the presidential palace, the former Greek Orthodox Bishop from Paphos, Gennadios, appointed Nicos Sampson as the new President. Sampson was known as a brutal paramilitary leader in the inter-communal strife of 1963/64 and a fierce supporter of enosis.
21
Upon instruction from Prime Minister Ecevit, the Turkish army landed on Cyprus on 20 July 1974, quickly seizing Kyrenia and circa 5% of Cypriot territory. The Greek junta broke down on 23 July 1974 and was replaced by a civilian administration. In Cyprus, the speaker of the House, Clerides, assumed office when Sampson resigned as President on the same day. Clerides then represented Cyprus in the international conference of Geneva in July 1974. At this conference, Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom, and the Greek Cypriot community entered into inter-communal talks with the Turkish Cypriot leader. On 14 August 1974, those talks broke down and the Turkish army advanced within three days to the ‘Attila-line’. Turkey thereby gained control of nearly 37% of the island's territory. Moreover, most Greek Cypriots living in the northern parts of the island (numbering around 140,000–160,000) had to flee their towns and villages. In the course of the intervention, severe violations of → human rights were committed by the Turkish army against Greek Cypriot civilians (Cyprus v Turkey [ECommHR App 8007/77] [1979] 13 DR 85).
2. The Illegality of the Turkish Intervention
22
Turkey employed military force against Cyprus in both phases of the intervention (para. 2 UNSC Res 353 [1974] and para. 1 UNSC Res 360 [1974]). In order to justify the breach of Art. 2(4) UN Charter, the Turkish government invoked Art. IV(2) Treaty of Guarantee, reading:
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.
23
Both the UN Legal Counsel Kelsen (in an unpublished opinion of 12 May 1959), as well as an important number of writers hold that ‘right to take action’ mentioned in the second sentence of Art. IV (2) Treaty of Guarantee must be construed narrowly so as to exclude military action. Otherwise, the provision would either fall foul of Art. 103 UN Charter, which gives precedence to the prohibition on the use of force in Art. 2(4) UN Charter (see ‘Article 103’ in B Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary [2nd edn Beck München 2002] para. 14), or be invalid in view of the latter's → ius cogens character (Palley 149 with further references). Another view is that Art. IV(2) Treaty of Guarantee constitutes a sufficiently precise ex-ante invitation of the Cypriot government to any Guarantor Power to intervene for the purposes set out in that Treaty (Epiney and Hofstötter 80; Hoffmeister 44; Wippmann 156). The consent of Cyprus expressed in the Treaty of Guarantee could thus theoretically justify the use of force by a Guarantor Power when the strict requirements are fulfilled. However, given that at the very least the second phase of the Turkish intervention did not pursue the aim of re-establishing the status quo ante, almost all authors conclude that the Turkish intervention was illegal under international law (dissenting Necatigil 132).
D. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
1. The Proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
24
On 13 February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot administration reorganized itself by proclaiming a ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ (‘TFSC’). This entity saw itself as a federated State within the Republic of Cyprus although the latter was not organized as a federation. The TFSC was firmly ruled by the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. He also concluded the Third Vienna Agreement (‘Vienna III Agreement’) with his Greek Cypriot counterpart. Most of the Turkish Cypriots who had lived in the southern part of Cyprus were allowed to resettle in the northern part. Moreover, Turkey and the TFSC encouraged a significant number of Turkish settlers to move to northern Cyprus, thereby affecting the demographic composition of the island.
25
Having been re-elected as President of the TFSC twice, in 1975 and 1981, Denktash received support from the Turkish army under General Kenan Evren—governing in Ankara since the coup d'état in September 1980—to upgrade the Turkish Cypriot entity. On 15 November 1983 the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) was proclaimed. The Constitution of May 1985 closely resembles the Turkish (military) Constitution of 1982, but also includes some elements of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution (Rumpf 176). Turkey recognized the TRNC as an independent State (→ Recognition). This move caused sharp international resistance. The UN Security Council, in Resolution 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983, declared that the proclamation of the TRNC should be considered ‘null and void’ and called upon all States not to recognize it (→ Non-Recognition). Moreover, when Turkey established diplomatic relations with the TRNC, the UN Security Council called on States not to ‘facilitate or in any way assist the secessionist entity’ (UNSC Res 550 [1984]).
2. The Legal Status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
26
According to today's prevailing view, ‘an entity is not a State because it is recognized; it is recognized because it is a State’ (Crawford 93). In the case of the TRNC, the fulfilment of at least two of the objective criteria of statehood—territory and population —cannot be denied. Whether there is an independent government in view of the close ties with Turkey is subject to debate (finding against Chrysostomides 259–79; Hoffmeister 51–52; finding in favour Necatigil 320 with further references; Talmon [2006] 37).
27
In any case, even if statehood of the TRNC were to be assumed, account must be taken of the UN Security Council's call for collective non-recognition. The practice, followed by all UN Member States, is not to enter into relations with the TRNC (which presupposes attributes of sovereignty). Accordingly, the TRNC is neither admitted to international organizations, nor does it conclude international → treaties with other States except Turkey. Moreover, the TRNC government cannot avail itself of any sovereign rights under the → law of the sea. TRNC citizenship is internationally invalid for → immigration purposes, but may be relevant for personnel matters under → private international law (Talmon [2006] 491–95).
28
On the other hand, not all legal acts of the TRCN are internationally irrelevant. In line with the finding of the → International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) ([1971] ICJ Rep 16), legal arrangements and transactions should be deemed valid, ‘the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the territory’ (ibid para. 125). This means that at least documents and acts relating to personal status have to be generally accepted. Other administrative or judicial decisions may be regarded as valid provided that they do not interfere with vested human rights of other persons, in particular Greek Cypriot refugees (see Loizidou v Turkey [Judgment of 18 December 1996] [Merits]; for a critical analysis Tezcan 122–208). Finally, the use of seaports in the northern part of Cyprus might be in violation of domestic law of the Republic of Cyprus, as the government closed them for international traffic in 1974. However, under international law, third States are not obliged to comply with Cyprus' law, and there is no prohibition in general international law to use ports which are not under the effective control of the government. Rather, State practice has been to make use of seaports of States which were under the control of local insurgents against the will of the legitimate government (Talmon [2006] 766–72 with further references; Response of EU Commissioner Rehn of 18 January 2008 to Parliamentary Question E-4901/07 [2008] OJ C191/1).
29
In sum, the legal status of the TRNC—both if regarded as a non-State or an illegal, collectively unrecognized State—today resembles the status of a local de facto government (Epiney and Hofstötter 97; Talmon [2006] 265). Other States are free to engage with this secessionist entity as long as this does not imply recognition, facilitation, or assistance, the exact meaning of which falls within the discretion of States.
E. The United Nations Good Offices Mission
1. The Early Efforts
30
Back in March 1965, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr Galo Plaza from Ecuador, made an attempt to define parameters for mediation (UNSC ‘Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General’ [26 March 1965] UN Doc S/6253). However, as the report was not well-received in particular by Turkey, the UN Secretary-General U Thant instructed his Special Representative for Cyprus in March 1966 to employ his → good offices with the parties to encourage discussion among them. However, inter-communal talks in 1966 and 1968 produced no result.
31
After the Turkish intervention in 1974, the UN good offices mission reached first results in the Vienna talks of 1975–77 (under Secretary-General Waldheim's mediator Pérez de Cuellar). It led, inter alia, to the Vienna III Agreement on Resettlement. The UN also brokered high-level agreements in 1977 and 1979 between the leaders Makarios-Denktash and Kyprianou-Denktash. However, the negotiators were never able to spell out these short framework texts (4 points and 10 points respectively) in greater detail.
32
In view of the proclamation of the TRNC, new negotiations started under different circumstances in 1984. A proposal from UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar of December 1984 was ready for signature in January 1985. President Kyprianou, however, insisted on additional guarantees and time-frames for the withdrawal of the Turkish army. In 1989, de Cuellar tabled another proposal as a basis for negotiation, this time meeting the resistance of the Turkish Cypriot side, whereas President Vassiliou was ready to embark on it for the Greek-Cypriot side.
33
In his report to the UN Security Council (UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus’ UN Doc S/21183 Annex I, 7–8), the Secretary-General defined the notion of political equality as follows:
The political equality of the two communities in and the bi-communal nature of the federation need to be acknowledged. While political equality does not mean equal numerical participation in all federal government branches and administration, it should be reflected inter alia in various ways: in the requirement that the federal constitution in the State of Cyprus be approved or amended with the concurrence of both communities; in the effective participation of both communities in all organs and decisions of the federal government; in safeguards to ensure that the federal government will not be empowered to adopt any measures against the interests of one community; and in the equality and identical powers and functions of the two federation States. The bi-zonality of the federation should be clearly brought out by the fact that each federated state will be administered by one community which will be firmly guaranteed a clear majority of the population and of the land ownership in its area.
34
On 12 March 1990 the UN Security Council itself made a statement on certain principles for the settlement. According to para. 3 of the UN Security Council Resolution 649 (1990), the solution should provide for ‘the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects’. Moreover, the UN Security Council called upon the leaders to cooperate with the Secretary-General ‘on an equal footing’. However, after the decision of the Cyprus government to apply for → European (Economic) Community (‘EC’) membership on 4 July 1990, the UN Good Offices Mission came to a temporary standstill. Only on 11 October 1991, when the UN Security Council endorsed de Cuellar's report of 8 March 1990 in Resolution 716 (1991) ([11 October 1991] SCOR 46th Year 29), the UN re-engaged.
2. The Boutros-Ghali Set of Ideas
35
Drawing from his predecessor's work, the new Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali convened the parties in spring 1992 and presented an elaborate set of ideas in August of that year (UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus’ [3 April 1992] UN Doc S/23780). With the backing of the UN Security Council (UNSC Res 774 [1992] [26 August 1992] SCOR 47th Year 94), he discussed his 100 proposals with Denktash and Vassiliou in face-to-face talks in October 1992. Dissatisfied with Turkish Cypriot demands on his set of ideas, Boutros-Ghali then shifted the focus from the framework agreement to confidence-building measures in 1993/4 without reaching a breakthrough.
3. The Annan Plan
36
In December 1997, the European Council in Luxemburg decided to start accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. In its resolution 1250 (1999) ([29 June 1999] SCOR 54th Year 137), the UN Security Council called upon the new Secretary-General Annan to prepare a new good offices mission. Hence, on 3 December 1999, proximity talks were held between the leaders Clerides and Denktash. At the Helsinki European Council of 11/12 December 1999, the European Union (‘EU’) expressed its strong support for these talks and underlined that a political settlement would facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. Moreover, the EU Heads of States and governments granted candidate-status to Turkey.
37
On 4 December 2001 the two leaders resumed direct talks in the presence of Annan's Special Advisor de Soto. As EU accession negotiations were coming to a close by December 2002, Annan prepared the first version of his comprehensive plan on 11 November 2002 (Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, ‘Annan I’). Drawing from comments he received mainly from the Greek Cypriot side, Annan tabled a slightly revised version on 10 December 2002 (‘Annan II’). However, in a meeting at Copenhagen on 12/13 December 2002, the Turkish Cypriot side, represented by Foreign Minister Ertugruloglu, rejected the proposal. The European Council, meeting at the same time, formally concluded the accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus, hoping that further negotiation on the basis of the UNSC's proposal could nevertheless lead to the accession of a united Cyprus. However, the meeting between UN Secretary-General Annan and Denktash and the newly elected President Papadopoulos in The Hague on 11 March 2003 did not succeed: Denktash declared that he was not prepared to submit the revised Annan Plan (‘Annan III’ of 26 February 2003) to a referendum, having fundamental objections to certain basic points, whereas Papadopoulos called for the filling of certain gaps and more time for campaigning before the referendum (UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus [1 April 2002] UN Doc S/2003/398).
F. Accession to the European Union
1. The Prepared Accommodation of a Cyprus Settlement
38
On 16 April 2003 the European Union finalized the admission procedure with respect to Cyprus and the 15 existing and 10 new Member States formally signed the European Union Accession Treaty. The latter contained a specific Protocol 10 on Cyprus (‘Protocol 10’). According to Art. 4 Protocol 10 ‘in the event of a settlement, the Council, acting unanimously on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, shall decide on the adaptations to the terms concerning the accession of Cyprus to the European Union with regard to the Turkish Cypriot community’.
39
Due to a shift in Turkish foreign policy under the new Prime Minister Erdogan and following the election of Prime Minster Talat in the TRNC in December 2003, the UN Secretary-General resumed his good offices in January 2004. Unprecedented, on 13 February 2004, Papadopoulos and Denktash agreed in New York on a three stage-procedure. They would first negotiate between themselves in Cyprus on the basis of Annan III. Subsequently Greece and Turkey would lend their collaboration. If they were unable to agree on a text, Annan would have the power to finalize his plan. The finalized plan would be submitted to separate and simultaneous referenda in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community. Moreover, the European Commission offered technical assistance to the UN to ensure compatibility of the plan with EU requirements (Hoffmeister 164 and 189–93).
40
After intensive negotiations on the island from 19 February to 22 March 2004, the leaders attempted to finalize the negotiations in an international conference held at Bürgenstock, Switzerland. Having received a list of ‘essentials’ from the Turkish Cypriot side and a consolidated list of demands from the Greek Cypriot side, comprising 44 pages, Annan tabled his revised plans on 30 March (‘Annan IV’) and 31 March 2004 (‘Annan V’) (UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus’ [28 May 2004]). Responding to a Greek Cypriot request, the plan did not only cover the new constitutional and treaty arrangements: it also contained an enormous amount of federal legislation and by-laws that had been written in the technical committees and working groups (around 9,000 pages).
41
According to the plan, the United Cyprus Republic would be comprised of a common State with two equal component States. Most powers were allocated to the component States, the common State mainly responsible for foreign relations, monetary policy, federal finance, citizenship, and immigration. The common State would operate under a system of power-sharing and have a strong Constitutional Court, with several mechanisms to overcome possible deadlocks. Territory would be re-arranged reducing the Turkish Cypriot zone from 37% to approximately 28.5% of the island. Greek Cypriot displaced persons moving to the areas falling under Greek Cypriot administration would in principle receive their property back (around half of the Greek Cypriots who had been disposed in 1974). A property board would be responsible for dealing with the remaining property-related claims, operating under a mixed system of restitution and compensation (Platis Orphanides and Mullen 3–10) derived from the standards of the → European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (for details of the compatibility of the so-called 1/3 rule with Art. 1 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' see Pfirter 595–624). Human rights would be guaranteed at federal level, however with certain restrictions on the freedom of movement and residence. The Turkish army would retreat from the island in several phases, but both Greece and Turkey would be allowed to keep a contingent of 950 and 650 troops, respectively, on the island in accordance with a revised Treaty of Alliance. A UN peacekeeping force would monitor the implementation of the agreement and the Treaty of Guarantee would remain in force.
42
Insofar as the plan provided for exemptions from the operation of European Union law with respect to the acquisition of property and residence rights, a ‘Draft Act of Adaptation of the Terms of Accession of the United Cyprus Republic to the European Union’ was annexed to the plan (UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus’ [28 May 2004]). On 7 April 2004, the European Commission forwarded the Draft Act to the Council of Ministers for immediate adoption after an eventual successful outcome of the referenda on the basis of Art. 4 Protocol 10 (Commission of the European Communities ‘Proposal for an Act of Adaption of the Terms of Accession of the United Cyprus Republic to the European Union’ COM (2004) 189 final [7 April 2004]).
43
On 24 April 2004 separate simultaneous referenda took place. The voters in the northern part of the island voted with 64.9 % in favour, while the voters in the government controlled areas voted with 75.8 % against the plan. Therefore, the comprehensive settlement provided for in Annan V did not enter into force, and the EU Council of Ministers did not accommodate it in the legal order of the European Union. Rather, the Accession Treaty entered into force on 1 May 2004 as originally signed on 16 April 2003. Politically, UN Secretary-General Annan recommended to reward the Turkish Cypriots for their vote and called upon all States to ‘co-operate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)’ (UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus’[28 May 2004] para. 93).
2. Cyprus as a Member State of the European Union
44
Being an EU member State, all rights and obligations deriving from the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (‘EC Treaty’) apply to the Republic of Cyprus. However, according to Art. 1(1) Protocol 10, the application of the → acquis communautaire is suspended in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. In its judgment of 28 April 2009, the European Court of Justice clarified that the clause must be construed narrowly (Case C–420/07 Apostolides v Orams). Suspension ‘in’ the areas means the non-application of European law there. In contrast, it does not mean that European law cannot apply for situations ‘relating to’ the northern part of Cyprus. Accordingly, the Court held that a judgment from the Nicosia Court sitting in the government controlled areas must be executed in the United Kingdom on the basis of Regulation 44/2001 (EC) even if the plaintiff—a Greek Cypriot refugee—brought a case against a defendant—a British couple—with respect to property lying in the northern part of the island.
45
The European Union has also adopted a certain amount of Cyprus-specific legislation. Council Regulation (EC) No 866 of 29 April 2004 established a regime for the ‘Green Line’ (‘Green Line Regulation’). The EU thereby regulates the crossing of goods and persons between the two parts of the island. The Green Line Regulation makes sure that the introduction of goods into the government controlled areas complies with the acquis, whereas the Cyprus government keeps control over non-EU citizens that may cross the line from the northern into the southern part (for details Skoutaris 727–55).
46
Moreover, Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006 established an instrument of financial support for encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community. This instrument enables the European Commission to support projects with a number of objectives, ranging from infrastructure development to bi-communal projects or the alignment of Turkish Cypriot legislation to the acquis in view of reunification. The overall size of the financial aid package amounts to € 259 million.
47
Finally, in line with an invitation of the EU Foreign Affairs Council of 26 April 2004 (Council Conclusions on Cyprus [26 April 2004] Bulletin of the European Union 4-2004, 1.5.5.), the Commission proposed a Council Regulation on special conditions for trade with the non-government controlled areas (Commission of the European Communities ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on Special Conditions for Trade with those Areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the government of the Republic of Cyprus Does Not Exercise Effective Control’ COM(2004) 466 final [7 July 2004]). To date, the Council has not adopted this regulation, fuelling dissatisfaction that the European Union has not overcome the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, as recommended by UN Secretary-General Annan (Brus and Others 53–57). In return, making a political junction with the direct aid regulation, Turkey does not allow vessels and airplanes from Cyprus to enter its ports and airports (Statement by the then foreign minister Gül of January 2006). This practice, however, is in violation of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey following the Enlargement of the European Union ([signed 29 July 2005] [2005] OJ L 254/58) (‘Ankara Protocol’) extending the Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union to the new Member States. Eight relevant chapters in the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey have therefore been suspended on the EU side in December 2006 as long as Turkey does not comply with its obligations (Council of the European Union ‘Council Conclusions 16289/06 of 11 December 2006: General Affairs and External Relations’ 9; for an analysis Talmon 2006 [ChinYIL] 579–616).
G. The Peace Talks
1. The Talks Papadopoulos-Talat
48
On 8 July 2006 the two leaders Papadopoulos and Talat started a new initiative. In order to prepare peace talks at the highest level, they set up a number of working groups and technical committees. On 15 December 2006 the UN Security Council expressed full support for the process and called for an early completion of the preparatory phase so that fully-fledged UN good offices might resume as soon as possible (UNSC Res 1728 [2006]). However, during 2007 progress was limited.
2. The Talks Christofias-Talat
49
On 24 February 2008 Demetrios Christofias was elected President of the Republic of Cyprus. Having prevailed over Papadopoulos, the Secretary-General of the moderate Communist party (‘AKEL’) received from the electorate a strong mandate for the resumption of negotiations to reunify Cyprus. Moreover, as both his party and the CHP party of the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, were traditionally engaged in bi-communal reconciliation, this opened a new window of opportunity. Shortly after Christofias' election, on 24 March 2008, the two leaders made the working groups and technical committees operational. Moreover, they decided to open the highly symbolic Ledra street as a new crossing point over the Green Line on 3 April 2008.
50
At their meeting on 23 May 2008, Christofias and Talat agreed on a number of framework principles for the settlement. In particular, they affirmed their commitment to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. On 1 July 2008, they reached further agreement in principle on the issue of single sovereignty and citizenship for the future united Cyprus. Against that background, they announced on 25 July 2008 to move to the next phase.
51
On 3 September 2008 full-fledged negotiations were launched in Cyprus. This was welcomed by the UN Security Council in a presidential statement which also confirmed the Council's readiness to support the process and welcomed the appointment of Alexander Downer as the Secretary-General's Special Advisor on 11 July 2008 (UNSC Special Research Report No 3, 2). While progress in the talks on issues such as power-sharing, property, and security was considered slow in early 2009, the right-wing opposition party in the TRNC won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections in May with 44% of votes over 29% for Talat's CHP. Both leaders publicly declared their intention to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2009 and to put the draft agreement to separate simultaneous referenda.
H. Conclusion
52
The Cyprus problem has existed for far too long. While the UN has prevented the recurrence of fighting with the deployment of UNFICYP, it has nevertheless been unable to broker a political settlement so far. Even when the EU accession course of both Cyprus and Turkey provided for a unique international constellation, both sides were not able to express their will to compromise at the same time. Whereas Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership let pass the opportunity for constructive engagement from 1999 to 2003, the Greek Cypriot leadership opposed the Annan plan in 2004, inter alia because the signature of the Accession Treaty in April 2003 had already secured EU accession for the Republic of Cyprus. However, as EU membership did not bring about the promised ‘European solution’ to the Cyprus problem, the Greek Cypriot attitude became again more forthcoming as of 2008. In parallel, Turkey's accession course is ongoing, albeit hampered by, inter alia, the Cyprus problem and the non-access of Cyprus vessels to Turkish ports. It can only be hoped that a concerted effort from the leaders of the two communities, supported by Turkey, Greece, the UN, and the EU may bring about a bi-communal and bi-zonal settlement with political equality, while at the same time respecting the fundamental principles on which the EU is founded, namely democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
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